(Part I is here, and part III is here)
In certain respects, development of the view that embodied experience is crucial to understanding the mind and brain reached a nadir in the period after World War II, at least within psychology. Behaviorism had redefined psychology as an “objective” science with no need to refer to consciousness [...]
June 27, 2009
Categories: Francisco Varela, cognitive science, medicine, neurophenomenology . Tags: clinical neurophenomenology, cognitive science, history of neurophenomenology, methodologies, phenomenology, philosophy, representationalist theories . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment
Were people utterly inaccurate at judging their body state and reporting on it, clinical medicine would be deprived of a critical tool. Evidence has accumulated that in certain circumstances, some people are evidently able to access information about the physiological processes inside of their bodies, and to report on it. Experiments seem to demonstrate that [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: cognitive science, embodiment, interoception, introspection, neurophenomenology, symptom reports, visceral perception . Tags: body knowledge, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, interoception, physiological state information, symptom reports, Trusting the Subject?, verbal reports, visceral perception . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment
The psychologist Raymond Gibbs (2006) in Embodiment and Cognitive Science asks (pg. 28) “What underlies people’s abilities to move as they do and have any awareness of their bodies?”
The conventional answer given by psychology, medicine, and cognitive neuroscience is physiological and cognitive systems using information-processing. Gibbs cites the work of Bermudez, Marcel, and Eilan (1995) [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: Uncategorized . Tags: body knowledge, cognitive science, embodied cognition, embodiment, information theories, neurophenomenology, philosophy of science, physiological state information, representationalist theories . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment
An index of the status of introspection within psychology comes from Medin, Markman, and Ross (2004) in the textbook Cognitive Psychology, which notes (pg.20) that:
“Although introspection is not an infallible window to the mind, psychological research is leading to principles that suggest when verbal reports are likely to accurately reflect thinking“
These perspectives all can be [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: cognitive science, introspection . Tags: cognitive psychology, cognitive science, first-person methods, introspection, methodologies, pain, prefrontal cortex, psychology, symptom reports, Trusting the Subject?, verbal reports . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment
It is worth exploring the historical, Cartesian “body alienation”, or default privileging of depersonalized, dismebodied, system-centric theories of mind, of much or most of the fields grouped under the label of cognitive science and neuroscience. Psychologists, linguists, philosophers, and neuroscientists have spent decades using computational and information-processing metaphors and models to explain behavior, problem-solving, memory, [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: Uncategorized . Tags: cognitive science, embodiment, enactive cognitive neuroscience, Francisco Varela, neurophenomenology . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment