“Spatiotemporal Continuity
The mysterious quality of our visceral space is based not only on such experiences but on all that is not experienced of our inner body, I have hitherto focused on what interoceptions we do have; they are marked by a limited qualitative range and a spatial ambiguity that together restrict our perceptual discriminations. Furthermore, [...]
June 26, 2009
Categories: Uncategorized . Tags: body knowledge, embodied cognition, embodiment, first-person methods, neurophenomenology, phenomenology, philosophy, visceral perception . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment
An index of the status of introspection within psychology comes from Medin, Markman, and Ross (2004) in the textbook Cognitive Psychology, which notes (pg.20) that:
“Although introspection is not an infallible window to the mind, psychological research is leading to principles that suggest when verbal reports are likely to accurately reflect thinking“
These perspectives all can be [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: cognitive science, introspection . Tags: cognitive psychology, cognitive science, first-person methods, introspection, methodologies, pain, prefrontal cortex, psychology, symptom reports, Trusting the Subject?, verbal reports . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment
From Trusting the Subject (2003), Anthony Jack and Andreas Roepstorff write:
“The unique challenge facing a science of consciousness is that that the best instrument available for measuring experience depends on cognitive processes internal to the subject. So just how much faith can we place in the capacity of the mind to understand itself? In principle, [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: cognitive science, introspection, symptom reports . Tags: cognitive psychology, first-person methods, introspection, Jack and Roepstorff, methodologies, psychology, Trusting the Subject?, validity, verbal reports . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment