Were people utterly inaccurate at judging their body state and reporting on it, clinical medicine would be deprived of a critical tool. Evidence has accumulated that in certain circumstances, some people are evidently able to access information about the physiological processes inside of their bodies, and to report on it. Experiments seem to demonstrate that [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: cognitive science, embodiment, interoception, introspection, neurophenomenology, symptom reports, visceral perception . Tags: body knowledge, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, interoception, physiological state information, symptom reports, Trusting the Subject?, verbal reports, visceral perception . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment
I use the term“body-knowledge” in my dissertation research primarily to refer to the experience of knowing about one’s own body, and especially embracing perception and assessments of the body through the body. It is meant to straddle the classic cognitive psychology distinction between explicit knowledge that is verbalizable, and implicit knowledge that may only be [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: Francisco Varela, embodiment, interoception, visceral perception . Tags: body knowledge, embodied cognition, embodiment, Francisco Varela, interoception, Merleau-Ponty, neurophenomenology, physiological state information, visceral perception . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment
Hugo Critchley et al. (2004) state that (pg.189) “the internal state of the body is conveyed through a dedicated lamina-1 spinothalamocortical pathway that converges with vagal afferents”. These afferent nerves are noteworthy for the smallness of their diameter in comparison with the larger afferents that apparently deal with proprioception, the perception of the body in [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: embodiment, interoception, visceral perception . Tags: afferent, body knowledge, Bud Craig, cardiac, cingular cortex, EEG, fMRI, heartbeat evoked potential, heartbeat perception, Hugo Critchley, insula, interoception, Olga Pollatos, orbitofrontal cortex, parasympathetic, physiological state information, prefrontal cortex, Rainer Schandry, S1, somatosensory cortex, sympathetic, viscera . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment
Models of how people are able to access physiological state information should take into account a long-running divide in cognitive neuroscience about to what extent explanations, models, and purported mechanisms privilege local, reductionistic, and/or modular theories, as opposed to global and holistic theories that emphasize connectedness with and interdependence of particular systems to the entire [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: Uncategorized . Tags: body knowledge, cingular cortex, cortex, dynamics, embodied cognition, globalist theories, insula, insular cortex, interoception, localizationist theories, modularism, neurodynamics, neurophysiology, orbitofrontal cortex, physiological state information, representationalist theories, S1, somatosensory cortex, visceral perception, Walter Freeman . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment
While the anatomical basis of how nerve projections enable perception of the body is rather well known, physicians confront situations where patient verbal reporting about symptoms does not match models based on neurophysiological mechanisms. For instance, the Merck Manual Medical Library (2009) states:
“Painful stimuli from thoracic organs can produce discomfort described as pressure, gas, burning, [...]
June 25, 2009
Categories: clinical neurophenomenology, interoception, introspection, medicine, symptom reports, visceral perception . Tags: body knowledge, clinical neurophenomenology, existential-physiological discrepancy, interoception, introspection, Merck Manual, methodologies, neurophysiology, pain, referred pain, symptom reports, symptoms, verbal reports, visceral perception . Author: neuronoid . Comments: Leave a Comment