(Part II is here, and Part III is here)
I will attempt in three essays to outline the sweep of ideas, researchers, and works that lead a few of us to speak of “neurophenomenology” as a more or less distinct field. Part I traces 19th century psychology, neurology, and phenomenology roughly up to World War II. [...]
History of the development of neurophenomenology-pt.1
Modularism vs. globalism in cognitive neuroscience: implications for a science of body-knowledge
Models of how people are able to access physiological state information should take into account a long-running divide in cognitive neuroscience about to what extent explanations, models, and purported mechanisms privilege local, reductionistic, and/or modular theories, as opposed to global and holistic theories that emphasize connectedness with and interdependence of particular systems to the entire [...]
Gallagher and Coles on body schema vs. body image and the body percept
The philosopher Shaun Gallagher has collaborated with neurologist Jonathan Coles on the significance of patients with enigmatic body-knowledge problems (Gallagher and Coles, 1998). Gallagher has analyzed this clinical data in the light of phenomenology and neuroscience, and has an essential book for anyone interested in neurophenomenology: How the Body Shapes the Mind
Gallagher is formulating a [...]
symptom verbal reports and existential-physiological discrepancy
While the anatomical basis of how nerve projections enable perception of the body is rather well known, physicians confront situations where patient verbal reporting about symptoms does not match models based on neurophysiological mechanisms. For instance, the Merck Manual Medical Library (2009) states:
“Painful stimuli from thoracic organs can produce discomfort described as pressure, gas, burning, [...]
